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Abstract 
 
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) market is 
skyrocketing towards 100 billion deployed devices and 
cybersecurity remains a top priority.  This includes 
security of ZigBee communication devices that are 
widely used in industrial control system applications.  
IIoT device security is addressed using Constellation-
Based Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Finger-
printing to augment conventional bit-level security 
mechanisms.  This work expands upon recent CB-DNA 
“discovery” activity by identifying reduced dimen-
sional fingerprints that increase the computational 
efficiency and effectiveness of device discrimination 
methods.  The methods considered include Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and Random Forest 
(RndF) classification.  RndF deficiencies in classifi-
cation and post-classification feature selection are 
highlighted and addressed using a pre-classification 
feature selection method based on a Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum (WRS) test.  Feature down-selection based on 
WRS testing proves to very reliable, with reduced 
feature subsets yielding cross-device discrimination 
performance consistent with full-dimensional feature 
sets, while being more computationally efficient. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices are a 
specialized subset of IoT devices that support sensing 
and control in areas such as water treatment, power 
generation and distribution, oil and gas refinement and 
distribution, and transportation.  These critical 
infrastructure elements are commonly operated through 
Industrial Control System (ICS) architectures and it is 
estimated that a few billion consumer devices will be 
IoT connected by 2020.  This is orders-of-magnitude 
lower than some projections which suggest the number 
of deployed IIoT devices is rocketing towards reaching 
100 billion by 2020 [21]. 
 If reliable, these estimates suggest that some IIoT 
deployment barriers have been overcome while others 
of remain.  This includes technology-based security 
factors that contribute to cybersecurity being the top-
ranked challenge in IIoT device deployment  [19].  
When considered in light of ICS applications, improved 
cybersecurity is absolutely essential and protection 
remains a national-level priority within both the public 
and private sectors [8, 16, 30, 31].  The cybersecurity 
challenges are not unique to IIoT devices, and the need 
for increasingly secure  and reliable communications 
remains across other commercial applications and 
automation networks supporting medical, home and 
building automation, consumer electronics. 
 Cyberattack mitigation approaches for specifically 
targetted communication devices (e.g., IIoT access 
points) have primarily focused on bit-level solutions 
implemented in upper communication protocol layers.  
This includes the network and media access control 
layers with much less emphasis placed on physical 
(PHY) layer solutions [9, 13, 26].  The underutilized 
PHY information [32] can be captured in device 
Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) features that provide 
human-like discrimination and support a multi-factor 
authentication framework that benefits from combined 
first-level “something you have” (device address), 
second-level “something you know” (network 
encryption key), and final “something you are” (PHY 
DNA Fingerprint) checks [5, 22].  The goal is to realize 
multi-factor authentication benefits and improve device 
verification reliability [3, 20] by taking advantage of the 
speed and computational efficiency of biometric-based 
multi-factor authentication which make it a top-ranked 
choice for IoT applications [10]. 
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1.l. Relationship to Prior Work 
 
As a sub-class to the broader Radio Frequency (RF) 
fingerprinting domain, RF-DNA Fingerprinting has 
been successfully demonstrated in various applications 
[14, 18, 23], with specific use for IoT communication 
devices demonstrated in [7, 29] and IIoT devices 
demonstrated in [15, 27, 28].  Of greater relevance here 
is the most recent development and demonstration of 
Constellation-Based DNA (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting 
[25] and its use in reliably discriminating ZigBee 
devices.  As with a majority of related RF-DNA works, 
device discrimination results in [25] are based on a 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood 
(MDA/ML) classification process. 
This work expands upon results in [25] using the 
same experimentally collected ZigBee signals, with an 
alternate Random Forest (RndF) classifier introduced 
given its broad success using RF-DNA fingerprints and 
support for post-classification Dimensional Reduction 
Analysis (DRA), i.e., identifying the most relevent sub-
set of fingrprint features required for reliable device 
discrimination.  Resultant RndF performance with CB-
DNA features was not promising and included 1) a 
significant decrease in average cross-class percent 
correct classification (%C) when compared with MDA 
under identical conditions, and 2) the generation of 
unreliable RndF variable importance metrics which 
voided their use for DRA assessments. 
Degraded performance of the usually-comparable-
to-MDA RndF classifier and its ineffectiveness for 
reliable DRA motivated the introduction and first use 
success of pre-classification DRA based on a Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum (WRS) test.  As developed and successfully 
demonstrated here, the WRS-based DRA method 
extends the concept of distribution-free assumptions 
and utilizes nonparametric statistical techniques for 
cross-class feature comparison. 
 
1.2. Paper Organization 
 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.   
Section 2.1 provides background information in sub-
sections providing details on DNA-Based Device 
Discrimination, Experimental ZigBee Signals, CB-
DNA Fingerprint Generation, and Classifier Models.  
Section 3 provides baseline performance results of the 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood 
(MDA/ML) and Random Forest (RndF) classifiers.  
Section 4 provides details for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
(WRS) test, its use for feature selection using 
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA), and 
comparison of WRS vs. RndF DRA results.  Section 5 
provides the paper summary and conclusion. 
2. Background 
 
2.1. DNA-Based Device Discrimination 
 
Previous works applied DNA fingerprinting 
methods to both wired and wireless signal PHY-based 
discrimination [4, 14, 29].  This work focuses on CB-
DNA Fingerprinting applied to ZigBee devices that are 
representative of the 802.15.4 standard class of 
communication devices supporting ICS applications. 
The specific focus here is on device ID classification as 
a means to enhance overall ZigBee network security at 
the PHY doorway through which a preponderance of 
malicious cyberattacks occur.  The concentration here 
was on securing Zigbee device operation given that 
1) ZigBee devices and related 802.15.4 protocols are 
deployed world-wide, and 2) ZigBee operation is a 
representative protocol for broader IIoT applications [7, 
29].  The degree of required anti-hacking security varies 
with ZigBee application criticality and will continue to 
increase as the number of connected IoT reaches a few 
billion and the number of connected IIoT devices a 100 
billion by 2020 [21].  The increased security risks due 
to rapid expansion may be offset as the next generation 
of IIoT hardware technologies are evolving to include 
multi-protocol 802.15.4/Bluetooth/WiFi operation [24]. 
The development here was motivated by two key 
observations of CB-DNA Fingerprinting performance 
when applied to ZigBee devices [25].  First, there was a 
desire to consider alternate classification techniques 
and/or conditional fingerprint features with a goal of 
reducing complexity (processing time and storage) to 
better support real-time network security using the 
multi-factor authentication framework detailed in the 
introduction. The first action included a quick-look 
assessment using a RndF ensemble classifier given its 
previous success in related applications, i.e., it achieved 
near-equivalent classification accuracy when compared 
to the MDA classifier [14, 18].  The preliminary RndF 
CB-DNA findings were not promising and included a 
significant decrease in average cross-class percent 
correct classification (%C) when compared with MDA 
using the same input CB-DNA fingerprints at the same 
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR); this anomalous 
degradation has not been previously observed in other 
MDA and RndF classifier works. 
Second, there remains some question regarding the 
impact of CB-DNA feature number and feature 
“information” content on performance.  For the Atmel 
ZigBee devices used here, [25] shows that CB-DNA 
Fingerprinting provided improved classification 
performance relative to RF-DNA Fingerprinting, with 
the best overall performance obtained for conditional 
versus unconditional CB-DNA features.  Of note is the 
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disparity between the fingerprint dimensions which 
included NUcnd = 36 unconditional and NCnd = 120 
conditional features.  Thus, it is reasonable to ask if the 
better conditional fingerprinting performance is due to 
increased feature “information” or simply a matter of 
using more features. 
Degraded performance of the usually-better-than-
MDA RndF classifier and increased classification 
performance using an increased number of conditional 
features motivated the use of DRA here for CB-DNA 
Fingerprinting.  The two DRA techniques considered 
here included 1) the post-classification RndF method 
used for the initial quick-look assessment, with 
additional analyses conducted for multiple DRA subsets 
based on rank-ordered Gini variable importance indices, 
and 2) the first use of a pre-classification WRS test that 
yields a comparative metric reflecting feature relevance 
and enabling rank-ordered DRA subset feature 
selection.  The WRS-based DRA method here extends 
the concept of distribution-free assumptions and utilizes 
nonparametric statistical techniques for cross-class 
feature comparison.  A head-to-head comparison of 
RndF-based and WRS-based DRA feature selection 
was completed using MDA/ML classification with a 
given number of NDRA selected features.   
 
2.2. Experimental ZigBee Signals 
 
 To enable direct comparison, results here are based 
on fingerprints generated from the same experimentally 
collected ZigBee signals used in [25].  For compleness, 
a summary of the experimental collection details are 
provided here (see [25] for additional details).  
Emissions were collected from the ND = 10 like-model 
Atmel devices in a relatively benign (limited 
multipath) office environment using an Ettus USRP 
X310 radio with the collection bandwidth set to 
WColl = 10 MHz and operating at a sample frequency of 
fSamp = 10 MSps per I/Q channel.  Post-collection 
processing included down-conversion and baseband 
filtering with a 16th-order Butterworth filter having a 
−3.0 dB bandwidth of WBB = 2 MHz. 
 Following post-collection processing, the average 
estimated SNR across all devices and collections was 
SNRC ≈ 40.0 dB.  Prior to CB-DNA fingerprint 
generation per Section 2.3, additional processing was 
applied that included 1) constellation de-rotation 
(phase synchronization) on a burst-by-burst basis, 
along with 2) SNR-scaling by adding independent, like-
filtered (WBB = 2 MHz), power-scaled Additive White 
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to set the desire analysis 
range of SNR ∈ [4.0, 40.0]. 
 Complete details for the Atmel ZigBee devices can 
be found in [1, 2], with some details summarized here 
in Table 1 for completeness.  the Atmel devices include 
an AT86RF230 radio transceiver [2] that supports 
802.15.4 standard compliant operation in the 2.4 GHz 
band.  As low cost, low power alternatives the Atmel 
devices are widely used in wireless sensor network, 
ICS, home and building automation, and many other 
consumer electronic applications [1].  The general 
ZigBee PHY layer characteristics for these devices are 
are shown in Fig. 1.  As typical in other wireless 
protocols, each transmitted ZigBee burst includes a 
preamble response (first 8.3 mSec) that is the primary 
region of interest exploited for RF-DNA Fingerprinting.  
For the conditional CB-DNA fingerprint generation 
process described in Section 2.3 and subsequent results, 
statistical features are extracted from all received 
communication symbols within each burst. 
 
 
Table 1.  ZigBee physical operating characteristics. 
FREQUENCY 2.4 GHz, 868 MHz, 915 MHz  
BIT RATE 20-250 Kbits/s 
SECURITY 
PHY - None 
Network - AES 128 
LATENCY ≈ 1000 mSec 
RANGE 1-75 Meters 
MODULATION O-QPSK 
 
 
Figure 1.  ZigBee protocol layer components. 
 
2.3. CB-DNA Fingerprint Generation 
 
Previous DNA-based works have used any number 
of available DNA types, including RF-DNA extracted 
from both intentional and unintentional radiated 
emissions, Wired Signal DNA (WS-DNA) [14, 15], and 
most recently CB-DNA [25].  The CB-DNA 
fingerprints used here are identical to those in [25] and 
their development is presented here for completeness.  
The development is based on an arbitrary complex 
sequence {X} having NX elements and the same 
NStat = 14 fingerprint features (statistics) are calculated 
for both the 1) polar magnitude (Mag) and angle (Ang) 
components, and 2) rectangular real (Re) and 
imaginary (Im) components of {X}. 
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The specific CB-DNA features used here for polar 
representation features included variance (σ2), skewness 
(γ) and kurtosis (κ) of both the magnitude {Mag[X]} 
and angle {Ang[X]} sequences (6 total polar statistics).  
Rectangular representation features are calculated using 
the [Re{X}:Im{X}]2xNX matrix, with calculated statistics 
including three unique co-variance σ2σ2(1:3) values, two 
non-trivial co-skewness moments γγ(1:2), and three non-
trivial co-kurtosis κκ(1:3) moments.  Accounting for all 
possible statistics, the Statistical Fingerprint vector for 
complex sequence {X} is formed as [25], 
 
 
 
(1) 
where  denotes concatenation.  For conditional 
CB-DNA Fingerprinting the  in (1) are calculated for 
NSG selected conditional subgroups of the received 
signal constellation.  The n =1, 2, … NSG subgroup 
elements for the mth symbol in the M-ary signaling 
constellation are used to form the mth Conditional 
CB-DNA Fingerprint Vector  according to, 
 
(
2) 
which are then concatenated to form the Composite 
Conditional CB-DNA Fingerprint Vector as, 
 (3) 
where  is the total number of 
conditional CB-DNA features.  In general, both 
unconditional and conditional CB-DNA fingerprint 
features can be generated using all or a subset of noted 
statistics, calculated for all or a subset of available 
projected groups.  Results here are based solely on 
conditional fingerprints given their demonstrated 
superiority over unconditional fingerprints using the 
selected ZigBee signals [25].  The full-dimensional 
conditional fingerprints include NFD = 270 features and 
are equally divided into NTRN = 550 training and 
NTST = 550 testing observations per ZigBee device. 
 
2.4. Classifier Models 
 
2.4.1.  Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum 
Likelihood (MDA/ML).  MDA is a computationally 
efficient process that has provided reliable device ID 
discrimination in prior DNA-based works [4, 7, 14, 29].  
It is a multi-class extension of Fisher’s Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and performs best when 
the input fingerprint features and their corresponding 
projections via the eigenvector-based projection matrix 
W are Gaussian distributed.  Consistent with the Fisher 
criterion, the matrix W maximizes the ratio of between-
class spread (projected class means) to within-class 
spread (projected class variance).  For discrimination of 
NCls classes using input fingerprint vectors have NF 
features, the projection matrix W is of dimension 
NF x (NCls-1) and is used to project (1xNF)-dimensional 
input fingerprints (F) into the (NCls-1)-dimensional class 
estimation space. 
Given a trained MDA model that includes matrix 
W, input fingerprint scale factors, projected class 
training means, and projected class training variances, a 
1 vs. NCls called-class estimate (correct or incorrect) for 
an “unknown” input testing fingerprint FTst is made by 
first calculating, 
  (4) 
where  is the projection of FTst in the Fisher space. 
The classification estimate for  is made based on the 
conditional probability relationship given by, 
 (5) 
where j = 1, 2, …, NCls and i≠j.  Assuming P(ci) = 1/NCls 
for all classes and equal error costs, the relationship in 
(2) becomes a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate that 
is obtained by maximizing the conditional  
with the class yielding highest probability being the 
called-class for  (this is now referred to as an 
MDA/ML classification process). 
 
2.4.2.  Random Forest (RndF). The RndF classifier 
implemented here was based on [6, 14, 17, 18] and 
includes an ensemble of single decision tree classifiers 
used to produce a single classification decision.  
Relative to MDA/ML, RndF benefits include 1) it not 
being constrained to specific input data distributions 
and, 2) it provides a measure of feature relevance called 
variable importance that is available after training [6].  
The two fundamental parameters impacting RndF 
performance include 1) the number of decision trees 
(classifiers), and 2) the number of predictors (features) 
sampled at each node. Classifier model development 
begins by using all observations (i.e., fingerprints 
containing all features) at a single node.  The initial 
node is then is split into two child nodes, with the split 
based on a random predictor selection and threshold 
values for features of each observation at that node. 
 Not all features are considered at each node and 
predictor selection is done with replacement, i.e., a 
given feature may be used as a splitting criterion at 
multiple nodes.  The DNA features selected as the 
splitting criterion include those producing the largest 
change in Gini-Index (GI) from a parent node to its 
children nodes [14].  The index reflects the probability 
Page 7129
  
that a single observation at a given node is from a 
particular class with GI = 0 occurring when a node 
contains only one observation from every class.  The 
final grown forest contains final leaf nodes, each of 
which represents an individual classification decision 
for a given input fingerprint. 
 The resultant classifier can be used for post-
classification RndF-based DRA feature selection by 
considering the mean decrease in GI, denoted as λGI(k) 
[14, 18] and computed for the kth feature by averaging 
the change in GI each time the kth feature is used at a 
splitting decision.  The resulting vector of λGI(k) for 
k = 1, 2, …, NF is sorted and provides the mechanism 
feature ranking to form RndF-selected DRA subsets. 
 
3.  Results: MDA/ML vs. RndF 
 
 RndF was introduced to enable 1) one-to-one 
comparison with prior MDA/ML performance in [25], 
and 2) assessment of post-classification RndF-based 
DRA as used successfully in prior work [14].  Results 
in Fig. 2 shows classification %C vs. SNR performance 
for MDA/ML and RndF classifiers under selected 
fingerprinting conditions.  The two highest %C curves 
are MDA/ML classifier performance using NCond = 270 
conditional and NUcnd = 36 unconditional CB-DNA 
fingerprint features as in [25].  These are provided for 
reference with the highest conditional MDA/ML curve 
being the baseline for RndF comparisons. 
 The MDA/ML results in Fig. 2 affirm intuition that 
adding more features improves accuracy, but a question 
remains as to whether or not there is a smaller subset of 
conditional features, closer in number to the 
unconditional feature set, that could achieve similar 
accuracy.  Given that MDA/ML provides no insight 
into feature relevance on the final classification 
decision, post-classification RndF DRA was initially 
considered.  The first DRA step included running the 
RndF classifier with the full-dimensional NFD = 270 
conditional CB-DNA fingerprints.  These results are 
provided in Fig. 2 and reflect considerably poorer 
performance than MDA/ML across all SNR.  RndF 
does achieve the arbitrary benchmark of %C = 90% at 
SNR = 28 dB but this is approximately %C∆ ≈ 10% 
poorer than MDA/ML. 
 As previously stated, the level of degraded RndF 
%C performance relative to MDA/ML in Fig. 2 is 
inconsistent with previous works.  However, this did 
not preclude consideration of RndF-based DRA using 
the rank-ordered Gini indices returned from the RndF 
classifier.  These are shown plotted in Fig. 3 for the 
SNR = 28 dB model that achieved the arbitrary 
%C = 90% benchmark.  The sorted Gini indices in 
Fig. 3a are used for DRA feature selection and the  
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Figure 2.  MDA/ML vs. RndF average classification 
performance using the indicated features. 
 
unsorted indices in Fig. 3b showing how the relevant 
features are distributed within the input fingerprints.  
 The sorted Gini indices in Fig. 3a reflect the typical 
highest-to-lowest ascending trend observed with 
previous signals but the ascension rate is slower with 
the the least relevant features asymptotically approach 
near-zero versus zero values; this indicates that nearly 
all of the conditional CB-DNA features have some 
relevancy as a classification predictor.  The RndF Gini 
relevancy is investigated by considering three DRA sets 
comprised of the NDRA = 52 highest, middle, and lowest 
ranked features (the highlighted regions in Fig. 3a).  
 The corresponding classification results for highest 
(▲), middle (▼), and lowest (►) ranked DRA subsets 
are shown overlaid in Fig. 2.  By comparing all RndF 
conditional results in Fig. 2, there is minimal impact on 
RndF classification regardless of the relevancy 
indicated by Gini indices in Fig. 3.  This affirms that 
selection of features is partly causal to degraded 
performance, and motivates consideration of an 
alternate DRA feature selection method that better 
exploits feature differences. This is addressed using a 
pre-classification method based on the WRS test. 
 
4.  Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) Test 
 
4.1. WRS Process Development 
 
 There are many nonparametric statistical tests from 
which to choose, and all of them focus on different 
aspects of the underlying data distribution.  The WRS 
test is considered to examine the feasibility of using 
nonparametric statistical analysis as a DRA method 
where the focus is on the difference in medians of the 
underlying distributions. 
 The only assumptions required to employ the WRS 
test is that the data (input fingerprint features) being  
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(a) Sorted Gini indices showing the relationship of the 
highest, middle, and lowest ranked NDRA = 52 features. 
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(b) Unsorted Gini indices showing the distribution of 
relevant features witin the input fingerprints. 
Figure 3.  RndF Gini indices for the NFD = 270 
conditional fingerprint features that yielded 
C% ≈ 90% results at SNR = 28 dB in Fig. 2. 
 
compared are from a continuous distribution and that 
they are independent (both within their respective 
population and are mutually independent). Since the 
comparison for a given fingerprint feature is actually a 
cross-device comparison, the features are indeed 
independent given that CB-DNA fingerprints are 
extracted one-for-one from independently collected 
device emissions.  Moreover, the features are samples 
from a continuous time domain signal and are therefore 
from an underlying continuous distribution. 
 Having satisfied the assumptions, the WRS test 
considers whether or not the two different classes 
represented in the feature are from distributions with 
equal medians [11].  For the purpose of cross-class 
discrimination and DRA, the goal is to find 
comparisons that fail the WRS test.  That is, a failure of 
the WRS test indicates that, for a given feature and 
cross-class comparison, regardless of the exact nature 
of the two underlying distributions, they have different 
medians. This difference, should it be significant 
enough, may be exploitable by the MDA/ML or RndF 
classification processes. 
 Of note for this class of tests, nonparametric 
statistical methods in general do not have the same 
strict assumptions as their equivalent parametric tests.  
However, to produce a DRA method that is broadly 
applicable to various DNA Fingerprinting methods, the 
concept of asymptotic relative efficiency of the WRS 
test is considered. As with many nonparametric 
statistical tests, the asymptotic relative efficiency of the 
WRS test suggests that even if the underlying 
distribution is actually normal, there is a minimal loss 
of test efficiency (i.e., data required to produce a similar 
result) and strong agreement between the test outcomes 
whether using equivalent parametric or nonparametric 
tests. Therefore, a nonparametric method for DRA can 
be used in any application if the test’s assumptions are 
met, and regardless of whether or not the equivalent 
parametric assumptions are met. 
 The pre-classification DRA methodology here 
utilizes the WRS metrics of input CB-DNA fingerprints 
to identify the most relevant features for DRA selection.  
Given that %C ≈ 90% was achieved at SNR = 28 dB for 
both the MDA/ML and RndF classifiers in Fig. 2, this is 
the SNR selected for WRS development and analysis.  
The WRS test is accomplished for each cross-class 
comparison and the output is either 1) a value of 1 
indicating the test failed to reject the null hypothesis 
and concluding the distribution medians are not similar, 
or 2) a value of 0 indicating the null hypothesis test 
passed and the medians are similar.  The results are 
aggregated into an NCls x NCls  upper triangular matrix, 
where the row/column combination represents the 
classes being compared.  This processes is repeated for 
each NF feature and yields an NCls x NCls x NF matrix. A 
simple metric for feature relevance arises by summing 
the NCls x NCls elements (excluding the diagonal 
elements) which yields NF scalars that are denoted by 
HF and represent the sum of WRS hypothesis test 
failures.  For example, the maximum value of this 
summation for a given feature for NCls = 10 classes is 45 
if there is a 1 in all of the upper triangular elements. 
The final test results are combined to form the vector  
 .  (5) 
 Similar to RndF-based DRA in Section 2.4.2, it was 
desirable to develop a WRS-based DRA method using a 
relevance metric that discriminates between seemingly 
similar features.  The hypothesis test presented here 
outputs a p-value for the WRS test, which may be 
thought of as how strongly to weigh the decision 
produced by the test.  Since the p-value is isolated to the 
specific test under which it was conducted, the method 
of summing the values as previously discussed is 
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inappropriate.  The use of entropy as a RndF Gini-Index 
alternative [12] motivated consideration of an entropy-
based approach here.  However, the entropy of an 
NCls x NCls x NF matrix of p-values provides a scalar 
representation which can be averaged across the feature 
to determine the relative weight of the decision criteria 
at a given feature. Since a low value of entropy is 
desired, each average value is subtracted from the 
maximum average value to compute the final average 
entropy matrix (E) of p-values, given by 
.  (6) 
 To produce a feature relevance metric to score all 
NF features, the matrix consisting of the product of the 
two metrics at the same feature is proposed as, 
,  (7) 
where each element in  is the relevance of the feature 
corresponding to that element according to this entropy-
based weighted WRS metric.  
 
4.2.  Results: WRS-Based DRA 
 
The normalized weighted WRS metric plots in 
Fig. 4 for SNR = 28 dB CB-DNA fingerprints include 
the sorted Fig. 4a metrics used for DRA feature subset 
selection and unsorted Fig. 4b metrics presented to 
enable visualization of how relevant features are 
distributed within the fingerprints.  Presentation of 
assessment results for weighted WRS metric 
exploitability at SNR = 28 dB is arbitrary and a matter 
of convenience to enable direct comparison with 
previously presented RndF results.  The Fig. 4 results 
provide intuition that among the full-dimensional 
NFD = 270 conditional CB-DNA feature set there exists 
more relevant proper subsets to be considered for 
classification DRA assessment. 
As with Section 3 RndF assessments, weighted 
WRS metric relevancy was investigated by considering 
three DRA sets comprised of the NDRA = 52 highest, 
middle, and lowest ranked features highlighted in 
Fig. 4a.  The corresponding classification performance 
for highest (▲), middle (▼), and lowest (►) ranked 
WRS subsets are shown overlaid in Fig. 5 along with 
the NFD = 270 full-dimensional performance.  The DRA 
%C trends in Fig. 5 indicate that 1) benefit is realized 
relative to the less effective RndF-selected DRA 
performance in Fig. 2, 2) performance is consistent with 
the highest-to-middle-to-lowest relevancy indicated in 
Fig. 4b, and 3) pre-classification DRA via rank-ordered 
weighted WRS metrics is a viable alternative. 
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(a) Sorted metrics showing the relationship between the 
highest, middle, and lowest ranked NDRA = 52 features. 
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(b) UnSorted metrics showing the distribution of relevant 
features across the input fingerprints. 
Figure 4.  Normalized weighted WRS feature ranking 
metric for full-dimensional NFD = 270 conditional CB-
DNA fingerprints at SNR = 28 dB. 
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Figure 5.  MDA/ML classification for full-dimensional  
NFD = 270 CB-DNA features and WRS-selected DRA 
subsets containing NDRA = 52 highest, middle, and 
lowest ranked features in Fig. 4a. 
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Returning to one of the main goals of reducing the 
number of required features to achieve a given 
performance, while minimizing required computation 
complexity (time, memory, etc.), Fig. 4a weighted 
WRS rank-ordering was used to analyze MDA/ML 
classification performance for various DRA subsets.  
Classification results for the top-ranked NDRA = 165, 
NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52 subsets are provided in 
Fig. 6 and represent an approximate 39%, 53% and 
80% fingerprint dimensional reduction, respectively.  
Of note in Fig. 6 results is that all WRS-selected DRA 
subsets achieve the arbitrary %C = 90% benchmark for 
SNR ≤ 24 dB, with the NDRA = 165 (39% reduced) 
subset achieving statistical equivalent performance to 
the full-dimensional set. 
 
4.3.  Results: WRS vs. RndF DRA 
 
For a final comparison, the RndF Gini relevance 
ranking in Fig. 3a was revisited and MDA/ML 
classification results generated for RndF-selected 
NDRA = 165, NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52 subsets.  These 
results are presented in Fig. 7 along with the equivalent 
WRS-selected DRA results from Fig. 6.  Considering 
the performance “gain” (G∆dB) of DRA selection 
methods at %C = 90%, calculated as the difference in 
required SNR for two DRA subsets to achieve the same 
%C = 90%, the WRS-selected DRA subsets provide 
4.0 < G∆dB < 8.0 dB over the RndF-selected subsets. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
 
 Estimates suggest that the number of deployed IIoT 
devices could reach 100 billion connected devices by 
2020 [21] and technology-based hardware security 
concerns contribute to making cybersecurity the top-
ranked IIoT challenge [19].  Demonstrations here 
address physical layer based security enhancement 
using Constellation Based Distinct Native Attribute 
(CB-DNA) Fingerprinting to reliably discriminate 
Atmel ZigBee devices that are representative of the 
802.15.4 standard class of devices commonly used in 
IIoT applications.  Results here expand upon work in 
[25] and demonstrate a pre-classification method that 
provides reliable fingerprint dimensional reduction and 
identifies feature subsets that 1) achieve discrimination 
performance of full-dimensional fingerprint sets, while 
2) supporting a more efficient implementation of multi-
factor device authentication. 
 Improvements here include the introduction of pre-
classification Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) 
based on a Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) test.  As 
developed and demonstrated herein, the WRS-based 
DRA feature selection process effectively identified a  
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Figure 6.   MDA/ML classification performance for 
the full-dimensional NFD = 270 CB-DNA feature set 
and WRS-selected DRA subsets thereof containing  
NDRA = 165, NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52, features 
selected using the sorted ranking in Fig. 4a. 
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Figure 7.  MDA/ML classification performance 
showing a comparison of pre-classification WRS-
selected features used for Fig. 6 results and 
corresponding post-classification RndF-selected DRA 
subsets based on Fig. 3a containing NDRA = 165, 
NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52  features selected using 
the sorted RndF Gini ranking in Fig. 4a. 
 
reduced dimensional feature subset containing 157 of 
the 270 full-dimensional features (an approximate 42% 
reduction) that 1) produced statistically equivalent 
classification performance as the full-dimensional set 
while inherently reducing the computational complexity 
(processing time, memory, etc.) required for real-time 
security augmentation, and 2) yielded an SNR “gain” 
(reduction in required SNR to achieve a given average 
percent correct %C classification performance) of 
4.0 < G∆dB < 8.0 dB at %C = 90% when compared with 
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equal dimension DRA subsets selected using a post-
classification variable importance metric produced by 
the Random Forest (RndF) classifier. 
 The effectiveness of WRS-based DRA for CB-DNA 
features, and corresponding abysmal performance of the 
previously effective RndF-based DRA process used for 
RF-DNA features, is attributed to inherent CB-DNA 
feature “information” that appears to possess more 
exploitable characteristics than those occurring in 
corresponding RF-DNA features of the same collected 
bursts.  This phenomena remains an area of interest for 
future studies, including the investigation of other pre-
classification statistical tests and their potential benefit 
for DRA feature selection.  Collectively considering all 
results, DNA-based fingerprint discrimination continues 
to be relevant as it pertains to exploitable physical layer 
information contained in IIoT communications. 
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